Abstract. We present a new protocol for cryptographic key agreement between devices which have had no previous association, and which does not rely upon mutual access to a pre-existing key infrastructure. This protocol is suitable for use in mobile ad-hoc computing environments, where the only channels with high data origin authenticity have severely limited bandwidth. The protocol illustrates one use of an heretical design principle: allowing the "same" protocol to provide different security services in different contexts.
Introduction
In ubiquitous computing [1] , ad-hoc sessions must frequently be initiated between devices such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). There is sometimes a need for such sessions to be secured by a cryptographic key, possibly to ensure confidentiality, but usually more importantly to ensure data integrity and originator authenticity. The devices and their owners may have had no previous contact or association, and there is in reality no guarantee of on-line access to a suitably mutually trusted Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In any case such infrastructures currently address subtly the wrong security requirement: in the ubiquitous context, the primary objective of the participants is not to learn or validate the identity of the other party to whom they are speaking, but is rather to establish secure communication between their own PDA and a PDA being held by the person whom they already know to be the "correct stranger" [2] .
To do this, the two PDAs must somehow agree a fresh strong cryptographic key, but must do this by exchanging messages only over public channels where the information which they exchange can be overheard and possibly altered. At the end of this protocol, the owners must be justified in believing that the new key has been shared between the correct pair of PDAs, and is not known to any other device or person.
A classical solution to this key-agreement problem is Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange [3] . However conventional DH relies upon the existence of a high bandwidth channel with high data origin authenticity, a combination of properties which is not generally available in the ubiquitous computing scenario.
Multi-Channel Protocols
In this ubiquitous context, there is increasing interest in "multi-channel" security protocols [1, 4, 5, 6] , in which we explicitly model different channels, with different characteristics, over which the devices may communicate. In what follows we shall assume a scenario with two channels having the following characteristics:
Channel one is a relatively high bandwidth channel, which is subject to both passive and active attacks [7] , including message deletion, insertion and alteration, masquerade and man in the middle. We can think of channel one as being realised by an RF connection.
Channel two is a relatively low bandwidth channel which is subject to passive attack (eavesdropping) but not to active attack, and which has high data origin authenticity: the owner of each device is assured that a message on this channel really does come from the other device.
We can think of the second channel as being realised by one device displaying a number on the display, and the owner of the second device typing this number into their keypad [6] . The second channel could alternatively be realised by physical contact between the devices [4], by an optical channel such as an infrared link ubiq, by one device playing a tune which is recorded by the other, or displaying a bar code which can be photographed and decoded by the other [5] , and so on. It is assumed that transmitting more than (say) 40 bits in each direction on channel two during a protocol run will be onerous in time and inconvenient for the humans.
It is important to note that, as far as the threat model is concerned, the endpoints of the second channel are the Application Program Interfaces (APIs) to the cryptographic modules inside the PDAs, not the PDA user interfaces such as screen and keyboard. This observation about channel endpoints is particularly significant in case the high-level security requirement is for integrity rather than confidentiality.
The requirement for data origin authenticity on the second channel therefore entails instantiation of some unspoofable mechanism (such as a red light) which provides the human user with the necessary assurance that the PDA keyboard and display are indeed internally connected to the relevant crypto-module API during the times when messages are being passed on the second channel.
We shall not assume that it is possible for the owner of the PDA to key a "secret" such as a PIN into the keypad, or to read a number on the display, without being overlooked. The attacker may also be able to exploit spyware running inside the PDA to view (but not to modify) messages sent over the second channel. However it is assumed that the attacker cannot see what is going on inside the crypto-module itself. In particular we assume that the cryptomodule can generate (or at least access) random numbers which are invisible to the attacker.
The New Protocol
The human users Alice and Bob have control of devices A and B respectively. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) modulus g and base q can be publicly known integer
